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High Plains Drifting: 
Wind-Blown Seeds and the Intellectual Property 
Implications of the GMO Revolution 
Stephanie M. Bernhardt* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 “If a man puts [corn] into my bag, in which before there is some corn, the whole is 
mine, because it is impossible to distinguish what was mine from what is his.”1  The 
Supreme Court of Canada recently rejected this principle in its decision in Monsanto v. 
Schmeiser.2  Canada now imposes strict liability for infringement involving unlicensed 
use of genetically modified (“GM”) seed, even in situations in which natural forces 
transfer the intellectual property into an innocent person’s crops.3  This article discusses 
the Schmeiser case and presents a comparative analysis of Canadian and American patent 
infringement provisions.  It further discusses possible alternatives to holding farmers who 
unintentionally possess a patented gene strictly liable for infringement. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE PERCY SCHMEISER CASE 
¶2 Monsanto owns a patent on Roundup Ready® canola seed.4  Roundup Ready® 
seed is a genetically modified organism (“GMO”), which is resistant to Roundup® 
herbicide (glyphosate). Farmers who purchase these seeds from Monsanto can spray a 
whole field without worrying about harming the crops, keeping weed control costs low.5  
Unfortunately, the only way to distinguish between a canola plant grown from Roundup 
Ready® seed and a mundane plant is through a chemical test or microscopic inspection.6  
Therefore, it is difficult for patented seed owners to monitor use and unauthorized users 
may have no idea they are in possession of a patented seed. 
¶3 Percy Schmeiser is a resident of Saskatchewan, Canada who has been farming for 
over 55 years.7  Schmeiser discovered Roundup Ready® plants in his fields after some of 
 
* I would like to give a special thanks to my future husband Justin A. Kwong for without his inspiration, 
encouragement and agricultural knowledge this note would not have been possible. 
1 Colwill v. Reeves, 2 Camp. 575, 576 (1811).  See also 15A C.J.S. Confusion of Goods § 6 (2005); 1 
Am. Jur. 2d Accession and Confusion § 1 (2004). 
2 Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. 910. 
3 See Id. at 910-11; Keith Aoki, Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 CARDOZO J. INTL. & COMP. L. 
247, 292-93 (2003). 
4 U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (issued Oct. 28, 1993); Can. Patent No. 1,313,830 (issued Aug. 6, 1986). 
5 Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 915-16. 
6 Id. at 914. 
7 Profile of Percy and Louise Schmeiser, http://www.percyschmeiser.com/profile.htm (last visited Nov. 
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his canola survived numerous sprayings of Roundup®.8  Despite the fact that he had 
never purchased the seed, Schmeiser took no action to contact Monsanto or remove 
plants he knew to be patented.9  Following an anonymous tip, Monsanto’s investigators 
confirmed the presence of plants bearing the gene in Schmesier’s fields.10  Monsanto then 
brought suit for infringement of its patented gene and sought an injunction, delivery of all 
infringing seeds or crops in Schmeiser’s possession, plaintiff’s costs, actual damages and 
punitive damages.11 
¶4 At trial, Schmeiser claimed the genetically modified seeds appeared on his fields 
without his intent and were unwelcome.12  Five farmers in Schmeiser’s area13 and 
approximately 40% of Canadian farmers use Roundup Ready® canola seed.14  During 
cross-examination, Monsanto’s lead investigator admitted there was no indication that 
Schmeiser illegally obtained the patented gene.15  Tests conducted by Monsanto 
estimated that 95-98% of Schmeiser’s 1000+ acres were contaminated.16  The trial court 
concluded it was unlikely that such an extensive proportion of contamination was due to 
windblown seeds alone.17  The trial court also dismissed the contention that Monsanto 
had waived its rights to the patent by not controlling the spread of the gene, citing the 
company’s monitoring activities and policy of removing contaminated plants upon 
request.18 
¶5 In addition to arguing lack of intent, Schmeiser asserted several alternative 
defenses to Monsanto’s infringement claim.  First, Schmeiser claimed that the Roundup 
Ready® gene was comparable to a stray bull.19  “Stray bull” cases are part of a larger law 
of admixture wherein, for example, a bull belonging to a cattle rancher wanders off his 
property and produces a calf with a cow belonging to a different rancher.  Under the 
doctrine, the mutual ownership claims are settled in favor of the second rancher.20  The 
trial court distinguished Schmeiser from the stray bull case law based on the fact that 
Monsanto does not have rights to the plant, only the gene’s use.21  Second, instead of 
basing his defense on “innocent infringement,” Schmeiser claimed he did not use the 
patented gene because herbicide was not sprayed on his fields.22  After analyzing the 
patent claims, this argument was rejected because the claims make no requirement for 
 
17, 2005). 
8 Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, C.P.R. (4th) 204, [2001] F.C.J. No. 436(QL), ¶ 38-39. 
9 Id. ¶ 40. 
10 Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 912; Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436, ¶ 37-58. 
11 Id. ¶ 9. 
12 Id. ¶ 11. 
13 Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 911. 
14 Aoki, supra note 3, at 294. 
15 Br. of Res. ¶ 38, Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436. 
16 Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436 ¶ 53. 
17 Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436 ¶ 118.  There is some controversy as to the statistical accuracy and 
reliability of Monsanto’s methods for determining the amount of its patented seed on Schmeiser’s fields.  
See Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436 ¶ 62, 73, 177; Br. of Res. ¶ 26, 55-118, Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436. 
18 Id. ¶ 96-98. 
19 Id. ¶ 93. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. ¶ 121; Br. of Res. ¶ 160, Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436. 
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use.23  Finally, Schmeiser argued that the patent was invalid because something that is 
neither caused by human intervention nor controllable by humans is not the proper 
subject matter of a patent.24  The court disagreed, holding that the patent was valid.25 
¶6 The trial court ultimately determined that Monsanto was entitled to relief in the 
form of the requested injunction, delivery of its patented seeds or plants in Schmeiser’s 
possession, profits of $105,000, damages of $15,450 and exemplary damages of $25,000 
(all amounts are in Canadian dollars).26  The Federal Court of Appeals affirmed.27 
III. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S DECISION 
¶7 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the lower court’s holding 
in a finding of infringement.28  In its determination of infringement, the Canadian 
Supreme Court looked to whether the “defendant’s activity deprived the inventor in 
whole or in part, directly or indirectly, of full enjoyment of the monopoly conferred by 
law.”29  A Canadian patentee has “the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making, 
constructing and using the invention and selling it to others to be used. . . .”30  This means 
that, in the case of GM seeds, the owner has the exclusive right to the gene in question, 
regardless of how the gene appeared or the intent of the farmer on whose fields the gene 
was found. 
¶8 The first step in determining use is to compare the object of the patent with the 
defendant’s activity, and assess whether the defendant’s action involved that object.31  
Use applies to patented products, processes, and their output.32  A defendant’s activity 
may involve the object of the invention even if it is not used for its intended purpose.33  
“While intention is generally irrelevant to determining whether there has been use and 
hence, infringement, the absence of intention to employ or gain any advantage from the 
invention may be relevant to rebutting the presumption of use raised by possession.” 34 
¶9 The Supreme Court found that Schmeiser did not make the patented plant within 
the meaning of the Canadian Patent Act.35  The Court held that Schmeiser’s saving and 
planting of the seed containing the patented gene, and subsequent harvest and sale of 
infringing canola, was equivalent to utilization and was commercial in nature.36  
Analogizing cells to Lego® blocks, the Court explained that “if an infringing use were 
alleged in building a structure with patented Lego® blocks, it would be no bar to a 
 
23 Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436 ¶ 122. 
24 Id. ¶ 78. 
25 Id. ¶ 90.  The specifics and merits of this position are beyond the scope of this article. 
26 Id. ¶128. 
27 Monsanto v. Schmeiser, [2003] F.C. 165, 205. 
28 Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 937. 
29 Id. at 919. 
30 Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 44 (1985) (Can.). 
31 Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 922. 
32 Id. at 921. 
33 Id. at 923. 
34 Id. at 927. 
35 Id. at 917. 
36 Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 930. 
Vol. 4:1] Stephanie M. Bernhardt 
  5 
finding of infringement that only the blocks were patented and not the entire structure.”37  
Although that is a broad interpretation, the Supreme Court justified the conclusion 
because it follows the principle that the patent owner is entitled to the entire monopoly 
and all of its business advantages.38  Justice Arbour’s dissent found this analogy 
particularly weak because the structuring of Legos® requires human intervention, which 
is not an element of the infringer’s actions in this case.39  Unmoved by this argument, the 
majority determined that the action of sowing and cultivating plants in order to make a 
profit was enough of a “deliberate and careful” action to support a finding of use under 
the principles and interpretations of the Canadian Patent Act.40 
¶10 Mere possession of a patented article may amount to infringement where 
unfulfilled intention to use is to the detriment of the patentee. 41  In some cases, 
possession of a patented chattel has an insurance value also known as a “stand-by 
utility.”42  For example, a fire extinguisher that is never used is nevertheless valuable 
because it is available at a moment’s notice should a fire occur.43  In Schmeiser’s case, he 
did not utilize the invention by spraying with Roundup® but the fact that he could have 
sprayed is a stand-by utility.44  If there is reason to spray in the future, no harm would 
have come to his crops as a result of the patented gene that was now present in his 
crops.45 Schmeiser argued he did not have stand-by utility because he did not possess 
enough Roundup® to effectively treat his fields should the need arise.46  However, none 
of the courts considered whether Schmeiser actually possessed enough Roundup® to 
effectively spray his fields. 
¶11 Traditionally, intent to infringe is presumed in commercial circumstances unless 
the defense shows the contrary.47  Schmeiser claimed he never intended to cultivate the 
patented plants.48  The fact that the gene actually hurt Schmeiser’s farming efforts is 
convincing evidence of lack of intent.49  Schmeiser practiced a common method of saving 
his seed every year (commonly referred to as “brown bagging”), which allowed him to 
develop a crop from seeds with desirable genetic characteristics.50  The contamination of 
the patented seeds ruined several years of work Schemeiser dedicated to developing his 
own strain of canola.51  The presumption that Schmeiser intended to cultivate the 
patented plants could have been rebutted with a showing that he quickly attempted to 
remove both the plants containing Monsanto’s patented gene after receiving notice from 
 
37 Id. at 921. 
38 Id. at 991-92. 
39 Id. at 954 (Arbour, J., dissenting in part). 
40 Id. at 935. 
41 HAROLD G. FOX, CANADIAN PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, 383-84 (4th ed. 1969). 
42 Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 923. 
43 Id.  The court looks for the intent to use the patented article as a stand-by utility.  Id. at 924-925. 
44 Id. at 933. 
45 Id. 
46 Br. of Res. ¶ 48-49, Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436. 
47 Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 926-27. 
48 Id. at 933-34. 
49 Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436 ¶ 11; Percy Schmeiser, Facing Down Goliath, One Farmer’s Battle with 
a GM Giant, 32 Acres USA 28 (Jan, 2002). 
50 Br. of Res. ¶ 7, Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436. 
51 Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436 ¶ 29-30; Br. of Res. ¶ 7, Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436. 
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Monsanto regarding the infringement, and that the infringing plant concentration on his 
fields was more likely caused by seeds having blown onto his property.52  These defenses 
were unavailable to Schmeiser because he continued the practice of saving seeds and 
planting them after Monsanto notified him of his infringement.53 
¶12 Schmeiser argued that if no advantage had been taken and there was no intent to 
use, there was no infringement.54  Schmeiser did not commercially spray with Roundup® 
nor did he market his canola as containing the patented gene.55  The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, and held that increased profits are irrelevant56 and the potential for 
future revenue opportunities, such as brown bagging, deprives the patent owner of its 
entitlement.57  Even if it was unlikely that Schmeiser would ever benefit from the patent, 
the opportunity is all that is relevant. 
¶13 The Supreme Court found that Schmeiser’s actions constituted infringement.  
Monsanto’s evidence at trial, estimating that 95-98% of Schmeiser’s 1000+ acres 
contained canola plants with its patented gene,58 convinced the Supreme Court that the 
infringing gene’s presence was too pervasive to be caused entirely by accidental 
delivery.59  The Supreme Court found that Monsanto’s rights to the gene were recognized 
by the law and Schmeiser could not defend against Monsanto’s infringement action by 
claiming a lack of intent.60  Monsanto argued that they took reasonable efforts to avoid 
the spread of seeds to other neighbors and the Court stated that it was not incumbent upon 
Monsanto to do more than was reasonably necessary to prevent the inadvertent spread of 
its seeds by the individuals who legally purchased them.61  Schmeiser was put on notice 
of his infringement, yet he continued to plant GM contaminated seed.62  Despite a finding 
of infringement, the Supreme Court found Schmeiser did not benefit from the Roundup 
Ready® gene because he did not use Roundup® on his crops, thus made no more profit 
than he would have if he did not use the patented seeds.63  The Supreme Court, therefore, 
ruled that Monsanto was not entitled to damages.64 
IV. THE REALITY OF WINDBLOWN SEEDS 
¶14 With 600,000 acres of Roundup Ready® canola planted in the U.S. and over 
4,000,000 acres planted in Canada,65 GMO farming is becoming a common practice.  
 
52 Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 933. 
53 Id. at 933-34. 
54 Id. at 932. 
55 Id. at 938-39. 
56 Id. at 926. 
57 Id. at 933. 
58 Id. at 912. 
59 Id. at 929.  There is some controversy as to the statistical accuracy and reliability of Monsanto’s 
methods for determining the amount of its patented seed on Schmeiser’s fields.  See Schmeiser, [2001] 
F.C.J. 436 ¶ 62, 73, 177; Br. of Res. ¶ 26, 55-118. 
60 Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 911, 930. 
61 See Schmeiser, [2003] F.C. at 196 (the Supreme Court of Canada did not revisit this issue). 
62 Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 936. 
63 Id. at 938-39. 
64 Id. at 939. 
65 Monsanto Co., Achievements in Plant Biotechnology - Evaluation: Canola, 
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Seeds may be spread by many vectors, including wind, wild animals, combines, transport 
vehicles, and commingling during storage.66  Wind is a major contributor to the unwanted 
spread of GM seeds.67  Bentgrass seed, another GM seed produced by Monsanto, can 
travel up to thirteen miles by wind alone.68  Canola seeds are not nearly as mobile, but 
because they are small, round, and smooth they also travel easily in the wind.69  Some 
estimates show that 800 meters of buffer are required to isolate canola from cross-
contamination.70  Other studies, however, indicate that the problem is less severe and that 
there is minimal—less than one percent—gene flow through seeds between adjacent 
fields.71 
¶15 Pollen containment is another concern.72  Plants produce pollen in order to bear the 
fruits for which we harvest them.  GM plants produce pollen that contains a copy of the 
dominant patented gene; therefore, any plant fertilized with GM plant pollen will produce 
GM seeds.73  This creates a serious problem for both restricting illegal use of the 
technology and for preventing genetic contamination of nearby fields.74  The desirable 
traits are significantly reduced in a plant created by cross-pollination.75  Nevertheless, 
“once [GM seeds] are released into the environment, the consequences of their 
uncontrolled reproduction in the face of decreased biodiversity cannot be predicted.”76 
¶16 Dormancy is also a problem.  Canola seeds may remain dormant for six to ten years 
before germination.77  This means that, even if GM plants are removed from a field, there 
is a period of up to ten years where there is a strong likelihood that a portion of the 
contaminated seeds that remain in the ground will germinate.78  This makes it 
extraordinarily difficult for a farmer to stop infringement once he or she has received 
notice that the gene is on his or her property. 
V. THE DEFINITION OF USE IN THE UNITED STATES 
¶17 Similar to Canadian practice, American patent owners are granted “the right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout 
the United States or importing the invention into the United States.”79  Use must 
 
http://www.biotechknowledge.com/biotech/bbasics.nsf/biotech01_canola.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2005). 
66 Drew L. Kershen, Of Straying Crops and Patent Rights, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 575, 578 (2004). 
67 Karl A. Thiel, Seeds in the Wind: For Monsanto, Patent Protection Stirs Controversy, 
http://www.biospace.com/articles/120699.cfm (on file with Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop.). 
68 Andrew Pollack, Can Biotech Crops Be Good Neighbors?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004, § 4, at 12. 
69 E. Ann Clark, The Implications of the Schmeiser Decision, 
http://www.percyschmeiser.com/crime.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2005). 
70 Id. 
71 Kershen, supra note 66, at 579. 
72 Br. Of Res. ¶ 18, Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Norman Siebrasse, The Innocent Bystander Problem in the Patenting of Higher Life Forms, 49 
MCGILL L.J. 349, 367-68 (2004). 
76 Carlos Scott Lopez, Intellectual Property Reform for Genetically Modified Crops: A Legal 
Imperative, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 367, 377 (2004). 
77 Aoki, supra note 3, at 294. 
78 Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 933-34. 
79 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). 
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incorporate, in some way, the principles of the claimed invention.80  Under this 
definition, it is important to determine what exactly the invention is.  For example, was 
the invention at issue in Schmeiser the patented gene or the seed’s ability to survive a 
Roundup® spraying?  It is logical to think that in order to benefit from the invention, 
selling the seed as Roundup Ready® or spraying with Roundup® would be required.  
Schmeiser did neither.81  The Canadian Courts determined Monsanto’s claimed invention 
was the gene itself and Monsanto’s U.S. patent expressly claims a “gene” in its patent.82  
Therefore, not spraying with Roundup® will not eliminate the use factor in the United 
States unless the U.S. patent does not claim the gene. 
¶18 In the United States, mere possession is not infringement without “threatened or 
contemplated” use or sale.83  Planting and harvesting seed constitutes use in Canada and 
the U.S. courts seem to be following this interpretation.84 
VI. KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
¶19 In Schmeiser, the Canadian Supreme Court did not consider intent or innocent 
discovery of windblown or “blow-by” patented plants.85  The Court decided to focus on 
what the alleged infringer did, rather than what he intended to do.86  The United States 
takes a similar approach, defining an infringer as one who makes, uses or sells a matter 
covered by a patent without the authorization of the owner infringes, regardless of 
knowledge or intent.87  Intent to utilize a patented invention is not an element of any form 
of infringement.88 
¶20 American courts, however, have not completely ignored all evidence of intent.  The 
Fifth Circuit recognizes that there may be times when literal infringement should be 
overlooked, if the infringing device only occasionally strays across the patent boundary 
or is too trifling to justify judicial intervention, but does not note any cases where this 
theory was successful.89  Reinforcing the theory that intent is irrelevant, the Sixth and 
Eighth Circuits have held that proving intent is not necessary, nor is proving knowledge 
of the patent’s existence.90  Most importantly, the Supreme Court in Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank explicitly held that 
intent is not an element of infringement.91 
 
80 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02(4)(c) (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2004). 
81 Clark, supra note 69. 
82 Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 916-17; U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (issued Oct. 28, 1993). 
83 CHISUM, supra note 80, at § 16.02(4)(b). 
84 E.g., Monsanto Co. v. Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (“Planting and harvesting 
seed is a ‘use’ under [35 U.S.C. §] 271(a)”). 
85 Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 915. 
86 Id. at 920-21. 
87 CHISUM, supra note 80, at § 16.02(2). 
88 Id. 
89 Hilary Preston, Drift of Patented Genetically Engineered Crops: Rethinking Liability Theories, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1163-64 (2003). 
90 Id. 
91 527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999). 
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¶21 Intent does play some role in the determination of damages.92  A willful infringer 
may have to pay treble damages and attorney’s fees if the court deems it necessary to 
deter future infringers.93  The penalty for unintentional infringement may be damage 
calculations.94  Although Schmeiser was found to have infringed, he considers the 
litigation a victory since Monsanto was not entitled to damages, court costs or technology 
fees.95 
¶22 Intentional infringement is presumed once a defendant has notice that he or she is 
infringing another’s patent.96  In the United States, an infringing defendant with no 
knowledge of infringement (intent) is very rare because most infringers are put on notice 
before they are sued.97  Problems occur with GM plant patents because infringing plants 
cannot be distinguished from the non-infringing plants without specialized tests or 
inspections.  Once the infringer is put on notice, the process of stopping infringement is 
not easy.  A Catch-22 arises because the only way to identify an infringing plant, aside 
from microscopic inspection, is to spray Roundup® and see if the crop survives.98  This 
process, however, would destroy all non-infringing canola plants.  Also, destroying all of 
a farmer’s plants will not stop infringement because dormant seeds are likely to emerge 
years later.99  In order for a farmer to completely rid his or her fields of GM seeds, the 
soil must be replaced, which is a very expensive procedure.100  If replacing the soil is 
financially infeasible, the farmer’s only other option is to tie himself to Monsanto through 
a license. 
VII. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SCHMEISER DECISION 
¶23 The Schmeiser case is binding only in Canada, yet this unprecedented case will 
likely serve as an example for the world to follow.101  Monsanto has filed 100 seed piracy 
cases in the United States and so far has recovered over $15 million.102  To date, 
Monsanto has prevailed in every case.103  Whether the Schmeiser case had any influence 
is not expressly stated in the decisions, although Canadian and U.S. patent principles are 
so closely related that it appears an American farmer in Schmeiser’s case would suffer 
the same fate. 
 
92 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
93 Id. 
94 Kershen, supra note 66, at 583. 
95 Percy Schmeiser, Percy Schmeiser Claims Moral and Personal Victory in Supreme Court Decision, 
May 22, 2004, http://www.percyschmeiser.com/decisioncomments.htm. 
96 CHISUM, supra note 80, at § 16.02(2). 
97 Id. at § 16.02 N. 1 (Supp. 2005). 
98 Preston, supra note 89, at 1159. 
99 Id. at 1160. 
100 Id. 
101 Stephen Leahy, Monsanto ‘Seed Police’ Watching Farmers (available at LEXIS, IPS-Inter Press 
Service, Jan. 14, 2005). 
102 Paul Elias, Saving Seed is Latest Tech Piracy, Jan. 14, 2005, 
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,66282,00.html. 
103 Id. 
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¶24 Monsanto’s position is that a farmer who finds infringing plants should contact 
them and request removal of the patented plants.104  This solution, however, will not 
solve the problem of innocent infringers having to pay Monsanto.  Farmers may worry 
because even if Monsanto removes infringing plants, as demonstrated above, this does 
not guarantee total eradication of plants containing the patented gene from the farmer’s 
field.  Also, what if Monsanto inadvertently destroys non-infringing crops, since it is 
impossible to distinguish between GM and mundane crops without specialized tests?  
Would farmers receive compensation from Monsanto for the innocent crops destroyed?105  
Although the farmers took no action in acquiring the gene, they could suffer increased 
costs and decreased profits in order to deal with the imposing vegetation. 
¶25 One of the biggest threats to farmers is the simple fear of being sued and having to 
pay to defend themselves in court.  It may not be a grounded fear that the company will 
go after every farmer with even a trace of its property on their fields, but the average 
farmer can hardly be expected to have the resources to defend himself in court should he 
be found in violation.  Monsanto’s teams of intellectual property experts and fierce 
litigators likely create fear that a court will put blame on a farmer for infringement, 
regardless of his intent to infringe.  In addition, there are other economic effects of 
windblown seeds.  Organic farmers can lose their USDA and other organic certifications 
if contamination is detected, which the American courts have recognized can cause 
substantial economic losses.106  European countries and Japan have banned many and in 
some cases all types of food items containing GMOs.107 
¶26 The goal of patent law is to reward the inventor proportionally to the social benefit.  
That balance is clearly disrupted by holding non-benefiting users liable for patent 
infringement.108  If non-benefiting users are held liable, then costs in the users’ enterprise 
will be greater than the true social cost of the activity, and incentives to engage in that 
enterprise will be inefficiently low.109  For example, many farmers in Canada and the 
United States will find themselves signing Monsanto’s technology license instead of 
going to court to defend themselves.110  In many cases similar to Schmeiser, Monsanto 
may not be entitled to any damages, but Mosanto certainly has significant resources to 
pursue licenses and intimidate farmers. 
¶27 Joe Mendelson, the legal director for the Centre for Food Safety, asserted that 
“Monsanto’s business plan for [GM crops] depends on suing farmers.”111  The costs of 
litigation make fighting an issue of infringement unfeasible for most farmers.  Schmeiser 
spent $400,000 (Canadian) on his battle with Monsanto.112  On Schmeiser’s website, he 
claims to have received hundreds of phone calls from farmers in similar situations.113  
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These farmers have received threatening letters to pay up or go to court.114  The Centre 
for Food Safety believes that hundreds of farmers have been coerced into paying 
technology fees to avoid costly litigation.115  With Monsanto’s budget of $10 million and 
a staff of 75 investigators, it is easy to see that farmers are sorely lacking the legal 
resources to combat Monsanto.116 
¶28 In addition to the disparity in resources between Monsanto and potential defendants 
in GM seed cases, Monsanto’s technology agreements include silencing provisions.117  
These silencing provisions make it difficult to estimate how many of Monsanto’s 
investigations, of which there are approximately 500 per year,118 result in licensing 
agreements.  They also make it extraordinarily difficult for farmers to collaborate and 
learn from the experiences of others in similar situations.  The balance between society’s 
gain and Monsanto’s reward is heavily skewed in Monsanto’s favor. 
VIII. TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD INTENT MATTER IN PLANT PATENT INFRINGEMENT? 
¶29 Some critics feel that the element of intent should be an added element to patent 
infringement of a GM seed.119  Reasons for the addition deal with the GM plant’s ability 
to self-propagate and spread without human intervention or participation.120  In addition, 
truly innocent bystanders will not disrupt patent incentives.121  Unintentionally 
possessing farmers will not gain any benefit from their infringement and the patent owner 
will suffer no loss.122  The Canadian Supreme Court considered protection for “innocent 
bystanders” in Harvard College v. Canada123 but refused to comment, concluding that 
the proposal should be left up to legislators.124 
¶30 Most critics, however, are against adding the element of intent to infringement of a 
GMO.125  The most persuasive argument stems from the current definition of intent.  
Intentional infringement occurs when an infringer is aware that something they are 
utilizing is patented.126  In a Roundup Ready® canola case, farmers will almost certainly 
be aware of the patent; it is the patented object’s presence and, therefore, their 
infringement, of which they may not be aware.127 
¶31 Requiring a defendant’s knowledge of a patent before damages can be awarded 
encourages patent marking.128  Windblown seeds will not benefit from patent marking.  
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Physically labeling the seed is impractical and once the seed is removed from a labeled 
bag, it looks like any other canola seed.  Another argument against the additional element 
of infringement is the logistical problem of defining who may use the “innocent 
bystander” defense.129  If an innocent bystander’s fields are contaminated, may the farmer 
sell his or her seeds to other farmers and continue the practice of saving seeds?130  It 
seems equitable to allow farmers to continue their traditional practices, but if allowed, a 
trained farmer could concentrate the seed with the patented gene and sell it, thereby 
acting as a competitor to the patent owner.131  Even if reselling were disallowed, farmers 
may take advantage of the seed’s properties after learning of its presence and 
advantages.132 
IX. SHOULD THE STRAY ANIMALS DEFENSE BE APPLICABLE TO PLANT PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT? 
¶32 Schmeiser argued the stray animals defense was analogous and applicable to his 
case.133  The stray animals defense is a property defense, which states that a person is 
strictly liable for damage done by a trespassing animal that he or she owns.134  In 
addition, offspring will belong to the person whose land has been trespassed.135  
Therefore, if applied in a patented seed case, not only would the infringer not be 
responsible for damages of the stray seed, but the farmer could also recover for trespass 
and interruption of business in addition to keeping the infringing plants.136  Courts do not 
allow persons who trespass willfully with their animals to benefit from their willful 
conduct.137  The courts in Schmeiser concluded that licensing agreements, monitoring of 
possible infringers, and removal of unintended infringing plants is sufficient action to 
support the conclusion that Monsanto controlled its patented gene.138  Monsanto knew it 
could not prevent seed from spreading.139  But should mere attempts to control the spread 
of intellectual property be sufficient? 
¶33 A comparison of animals and seeds explains why this defense should apply to 
patented seed cases.  First, both are living and reproduce without human intervention.  
Certainly, in farming, there is some human intervention, but intervention is not required 
for the plants’ reproduction.  Second, there is a stronger reason for the stray animals 
defense in seed cases because property rights are even harder to detect.  Unlike collars or 
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branding which are available for animal identification, GM plants can only be 
distinguished in a laboratory.  Additionally, once a farmer discovers an infringing plant, it 
is more difficult to remove or return that property to its owner.  Removing the property is 
incredibly expensive as discussed above, and return of the property is equally difficult.  
Finally, pollination actually converts the farmer’s property to the patent owner’s 
protected property. 
¶34 A critic of the stray animals defense analogized the seeds to escaped pigs. 
Now suppose that the escaped pigs did some harm, perhaps by destroying 
some crops.  In that case, it is true that the neighbour should have a 
remedy against the pigs’ owner, but again we would not suggest that the 
remedy should be that the neighbour can keep the pigs.  This is because 
the harm to the neighbour and the proposed “remedy” are entirely 
unrelated.140  
¶35 The Supreme Court of Canada in Schmeiser rejected the stray animals defense 
quickly because it did not believe property rights were applicable to patent protection.141  
Monsanto had a right to the gene and cell and its exclusive use that is distinguishable 
from stray animals.142  Ownership, the Court affirmed, is irrelevant to whether or not 
something infringes another’s property right.143 
X. CONCLUSION 
¶36 “But where a man willfully causes or allows the property of another to be inter-
mixed with his own without the other’s knowledge or consent the whole belongs to the 
latter. . . .”144  It is true that intellectual property rights are not fully consistent with 
tangible property rights, but in the case of a farmer unintentionally acquiring a patented 
seed, intellectual property rights do not seem totally appropriate.  The unique nature of a 
property that can contaminate the property of others and reproduce on its own was not 
considered by lawmakers when they drafted the Patent Act.  Something must be done to 
protect innocent infringers from liability and coercion while encouraging innovation and 
reward.  Unfortunately, former Monsanto employees hold high positions both in the 
Department of Agriculture as well as the Food and Drug Administration.145  These 
agencies seem unlikely to move in a direction to help farmers battle the aggressive tactics 
of companies like Monsanto.  This situation is truly David versus Goliath, but this time, 
Goliath is holding all the stones. 
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